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Introduction 
 
The 2008 conflict between the Russian Federation and Georgia was a surprise. It 
would be too much to say that the former USSR was peaceful before the outbreak of 
the Russian-Georgian conflict but there had been no new outbreaks of major violence 
since the collapse of Soviet power. The major conflicts of the post-Soviet period – 
the fighting in Chechnya, the ongoing disputes over Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Transdnestria, Abkhazia, Ossetia, and the civil war in Tajikistan (which ended in 
1997) – all started during, or were provoked by, the collapse of the Soviet Union.1 
                                                        
1 See the list of violent post-Soviet conflicts in J. Hughes and G. Sasse (eds), Ethnicity and territory n the 
former Soviet Union. Regions in conflict, (London, Frank Cass, 2002), xiii.  Only the conflicts in Tajikistan 
and Chechnya post-date the end of the USSR but each was intimately related to the Soviet Union’s 
demise. The end of the USSR prompted the conflict in Tajikistan and the protagonists formed up for 
the fight in the last months of 1991 by creating militias, ready for the outbreak of war in 1992. See J. 
Heathershaw, Post-conflict Tajikistan. The politics of peace building and the emergence of legitimate 
order, (London: Routledge, 2009), pp.19-30. The origins of the conflict in Chechnya also lay in the 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Many would characterise the international politics of the former 
Soviet Union as being fraught with competition and beset by 
weakness, war and chaos associated with contestations between 
nations and identities but this has paradoxically not generated a 
great deal of violent conflict since the end of the USSR.  
 
Most violent conflict experienced in the post-Soviet space have their 
roots in the struggles that took place as the USSR collapsed – such 
as the frozen conflict in South Ossetia – and new conflicts have 
been rare and small in scale. This paper asks why there have not 
been more wars in this sub-region. 
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Most of these conflicts have never really ended, but they have ‘frozen’ due to 
stalemate or Russian force.2 Consequently whilst they are not free of violence, the 
violence they have suffered has been generally low in intensity and extensity. 
Where there has been new conflict it has been short lived and has often been 
localised. Clashes between state forces, rebel and other armed groups in various 
parts of the former USSR since 1991, such as the fighting in Moscow following the 
closure of parliament in 1993, or in Central Asia with the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan after 19993, have either been small sale or contained, and did not spread 
despite some apocalyptic warnings.4 Violence against civilians in the form of 
human rights violations has in at least one case – Andijan in Uzbekistan in 2005 – 
led to large-scale loss of life, but again, the violence was contained and short-lived 
as mass and open fighting and repression.5 There has been violence during political 
succession struggles as during the 2005 ‘Tulip Revolution’ in Kyrgyzstan. However, 
again, the extensity of conflict associated with these events is low so that in the 
post-Soviet space overall the scale of new conflicts, the Russian-Georgian war aside, 
has been relatively low.  
 
This state of relative ‘peace’ across the USSR is the topic of this paper. The paper 
discusses why there has been no widespread conflict in the form of civil war or 
inter-state conflict in the region since 1991 and whether this absence of conflict can 
be expected to continue in the near future. In particular it will focus on Central Asia 
and Russia, although mention will be made of other cases too, and on the 
relationship between domestic politics and civil war and inter-state conflict. Russia 
and Central Asia are areas where more conflict has been expected than has 
occurred, and where gauging the prospects and sources of future conflict is 
important because of their geopolitical and economic importance. They are also 
between them broadly comparable to other parts of the former USSR so that 
                                                                                                                                                            
USSR’s dying days despite the fact that the major bouts of fighting there took place between 1994 and 
1996, and 1999 to (at least) the mid-2000s. Aspects of the Chechen conflict’s nature might have changed 
over time but its roots lay in, and the initial skirmish between Russia and separatist forces took place 
alongside, the collapse of the USSR, see R. Sakwa, 'Introduction: why Chechnya?', in R. Sakwa (ed.) 
Chechnya. From past to future (London: Anthem Press, 2005), pp.1-20 and J. Hughes, Chechnya. From 
nationalism to jihad (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007). 
2 For an overview of the frozen conflicts see D. Lynch, Engaging Eurasia's separatist states: unresolved 
conflicts and de facto states. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004).  
3 V.V. Naumkin, Militant Islam in Central Asia: the case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, (Berkeley: 
Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, 2003), 
http://repositories.cdlib.org/iseees/bps/2003_06-naum 
4 A. Rashid, Jihad. The rise of militant Islam in Central Asia. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 
chapters 7 and 8. For a recent assessment of the prospects of Islamicist violence that doubts the 
strength of insurrectionist forces inside Central Asia see M. Olcott, ‘Velika li ugroza dzhikhada v 
Tsentral'noi Azii?’, Pro et Contra 13 (2009), 39-52. 
5 In other words the Uzbek government went back to killing people away from the media’s eye. On 
Andijan see Human Rights Watch “Bullets were falling like rain.” The Andijan massacre, May 13, 
2005’ (2005) http://hrw.org/reports/2005/uzbekistan0605/, OSCE/ODIHR Preliminary findings on 
the events in Andijan, Uzbekistan, 13 May 2005, (Warsaw: Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights, 2005, http://www1.osce.org/documents/odihr/2005/06/15233_en.pdf). 
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understanding them and the potential for conflict within them may give us some 
clue to the reasons for conflict in other post-Soviet areas in the past and the 
prospects for conflict more widely within the post-Soviet space. The focus on 
domestic politics should not be taken to mean that international politics and 
exogenous factors are not important; reference will be made to such external factors 
where appropriate. Rather it is the argument here that thus far conflict has been 
dampened down in the region because of the ways in which domestic political 
developments have weakened social mobilisation and co-opted domestic elites. The 
area’s relative ‘peace’ is, however, highly contingent. The extent of its contingency 
can be seen by the fact that it is in many ways unexpected and, especially when we 
consider the wider region in to which Central Asia fits, unusual. Post-Soviet Central 
Asia is a zone of relative stability within the ‘wider’ Central Asia (roughly post-
Soviet Central Asia plus Afghanistan and Pakistan) and the larger Middle East 
(roughly the above plus Iran, Iraq, the Arab states and Israel) areas that have been 
labelled the ‘world’s most unstable region’ and a ‘threat to global security’.6 
  
In order to get a sense of the contingency of the region’s relative peace the chapter 
starts by examining expectations about the prospects for conflict in the area. The 
belief that there should be conflict in the area has been widespread since 1991 as a 
quick look at the titles of many of the books on the region’s wider politics shows: 
many contain the word conflict, or in the case of journalistic accounts the words 
blood and oil, in the title.7 The region has even been offered up as a new ‘arc of 
crisis’ to replace that of the Cold War (roughly around the Indian Ocean) described 
by Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1979.8 The idea that there should have been more conflict 
in the region comes from the analytical frameworks that have been used to assess 
the prospects for peace in the area. These frameworks have often been based on two 
assumptions that have sometimes operated singularly and sometimes together. 
These assumptions are first, that peace needs to be based on the construction of 
democracy, and second, that peace will only come about through the construction 
of states in the region that have capacity to develop the societies they manage. 
These assumptions are frequently related and operate together since it is believed 
that only a democracy can create a state with capacity. The chapter unpacks these 
assumptions and argues that they do not necessarily apply to the region as yet. 
Contrary to these assumptions this chapter will argue that it is the avoidance of 
democracy and related state building that has helped to preserve the relative peace 
                                                        
6 A. Rashid, Descent into chaos. The world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security (London: 
Penguin, 2009). 
7 See, for example G.K. Bertsch, C. Craft, S.A. Jones and M. Beck (eds) 2000. Crossroads and conflict. 
Security and foreign policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia (New York: Routledge, 2000), or R. Ebel and 
R. Menon (eds) Energy and conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2000). For journalistic accounts see L. Kleveman, The new great game: blood and oil in Central Asia 
(London: Atlantic Monthly, 2003) or J. Johnson, Oil, Islam and conflict: Central Asia since 1945 (London: 
Reaktion Books, 2007). 
8 See S. Akiner, Central Asia: a new arc of crisis? (London: Royal United Services Institute, 1993).  
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of the area. Instead of trying to develop either democracy and/or to build up state 
capacity, political leaders in the region have concentrated on regime building and 
the management of elites that this entails. In Central Asia this has sometimes 
happened with the connivance – deliberate and accidental – of outside powers, 
most notably Russia and China. Political leaders in the area have been relatively 
successful at this process of regime building and it has often supplanted state 
building. The chapter makes an argument as to why state building is more 
dangerous than regime building; state building threatens elites, regime building can 
be used to buy them off.  
 
This success at regime over state building does not mean that violence and conflict 
are permanently off the agenda in Central Asia. The paper will argue that the ability 
to build regimes at the expense of state building and its attendant dangers has taken 
place in fairly unique circumstances. These circumstances have provided the rulers 
of the area with the resources to buy-off rivals and forestall conflict but they may 
not be able to do this over the longer term so that issues of state building might 
have to be faced and the dangers of conflict dealt with more forcefully and directly 
both locally and by the international community than has so far been the case. 
Predictions of violence in the area have not been true in the past, in other words, 
but they may yet come back to haunt the region and its inhabitants. 
 
 
Our motto: ‘apocalypse soon’. Expectations of conflict in the post-
Soviet space9 
 
The post-Soviet space, and especially Central Asia, has many of the features that we 
associate with conflict both between, and especially within, states. The expectation 
that there will be conflict within the area has therefore been fairly constant since 
1991. As we have already said, the reasons for this are due to the analytical 
frameworks through which the region is viewed. These frameworks expect that 
conflict will be produced in the absence of democracy and/or of states with some 
capacity to develop their societies. These assumptions about democracy and conflict 
and states and conflict are derived from expectations about conflict in states derived 
from comparative politics and international relations. It is questionable, however, 
how applicable they are to Central Asia and Russia, or indeed to the wider post-
Soviet area. The following section will look at the assumptions and their application 
and in the next their actual applicability. 
 
                                                        
9 With apologies to Francis Ford Coppola and C. Benard, ‘Central Asia: “apocalypse soon” or eccentric 
survival?’, in A.M. Rabasa, C. Benard, P. Chalk, C.C. Fair, T. Karaski, R. Lal, I. Lesser, D. Thaler, The 
Muslim world after 9/11,  (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2004), 321-366. 
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The assumption that not being a democracy leads to conflict is a product of the 
large literature surrounding the idea of democratic peace (the notion that 
democracies do not fight one another). This has had two spin-offs that are of 
concern. First, the idea that democracies do not go to war with one another has been 
adapted to distinguish between full and fledgling democracies. Whilst the former 
are peaceful in their relations to one another, the latter are not. Indeed, one line of 
argument shows that new democracies might be more war prone than stable 
authoritarian states.10 This is because elites whose positions are not secure in a 
transitional polity, or who fear that they will lose traditional prerogatives in the 
process of change, might provoke conflict to protect their interests. This is arguably 
easier to achieve in a transitional polity where questions of identity and interest 
may be in flux and where institutional practices are still novel. These can make it 
easier to mobilise for conflict and to leverage domestic problems in to support for 
military action. Second, there is the idea that unfinished democratisation and the 
political chaos that comes from failing to consolidate a particular form of political 
regime creates the basis for intra-state conflict. This is because an unfinished 
democracy allows for collective action (unlike dictatorship) but does not create 
channels to make such collective action effective (unlike democracy). The result is 
frustration and this leads to violence by political losers. When rulers respond in 
kind a cycle of violence ensues. Unfinished democracies – variously labelled semi-
democracies or anocracies – are thus more prone to political violence generally11 
and civil war specifically.12 Legitimacy is also in shorter supply in an anocracy so 
that the recourse to violence is not constrained by social attitudes. 
 
The second assumption, that states with the capacity to manage and transform their 
societies are required to avoid conflict, is related to the assumption about the need 
for consolidated democracy at a normative level. Democracy is frequently regarded 
as providing state capacity since it creates state autonomy and legitimates power. 
By providing state autonomy democracy frees rulers from having to satisfy 
powerful social interests so that they can manage society more easily and hence 
avoid conflict. This helps provide additional legitimacy to democracy, but 
democracy’s own legitimacy drawn from the ballot box and political participation 
also generates some state capacity through the creation of infrastructural state 
                                                        
10 E. Mansfield and J. Snyder, ‘Democratization and the danger of war’, International Security 20 (1995), 
5-38, J. Snyder, From voting to violence. Democratization and nationalist conflict (New York, Norton, 2000), 
P. Collier, Wars, guns and votes. Democracy in dangerous places, (London, The Bodley Head, 2009). 
11 T. Ellingsen and N. Petter Gleditsch, ‘Democracy and armed conflict in the third world’, in K. 
Volden and D. Smith (eds), Causes of conflict in third world countries, (Oslo: International Peace Research 
Institute, 1997), pp. 69-81. 
12 J. Fearon and D. Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war’, American Political Science Review 97 
(2003), 75-90; H. Hegre, T. Ellingsen, S. Gates, and N. Petter Gleditsch. ‘Toward a democratic civil 
peace? Democracy, political change, and civil war, 1816-1992’. American Political Science Review 95 
(2001), 33-48. 
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power.13 This form of state power sees the state intersect with society and able to 
draw on social resources and compliance to generate capacity. Democracy and state 
capacity are thus related to some extent in theory and in the literature.14 The failure 
to develop one is often taken as a proxy for the failure to develop the other. This has 
been especially common in Russia. The failures of state development in the 1990s 
were frequently ascribed to the same factors as the failures of democracy. The 
failures of democratic transformation and of state development were also each 
ascribed to the other.15 The ultimate danger perceived in this is that it places states 
within the region at risk of failing; and failed states are synonymous with conflict 
and the export of that conflict since in a failed state the monopoly over violence that 
is core to the state’s definition disappears and is contested by would-be violence-
monopolists.  
 
Working from these assumptions Central Asia, and to a lesser extent Russia, were 
always going to be pray to conflict in the post-communist era because of the 
weakness of their putative democracies and the fragility of their states. There was 
more active campaigning for independence – at least in the form of sovereignty – in 
Russia than in Central Asia, but independence exposed the structural weakness of 
statehood in both areas. Central Asia was ‘profoundly’ unprepared as Pauline 
Luong Jones puts it, since the new countries there ‘lacked viable economies as well 
as state structures and ideologies capable of linking indigenous leaders to their 
societies’.16 Likewise Russia, it was argued, was lacking in any cohesive national 
identity that could rally its population behind a project of renewal.17 State building 
tasks were therefore huge and involved not just reordering of economies and 
systems of public administration, but also questions of identity. The bigger the task 
of state building the greater the danger, especially because weak democracy creates 
the prospect of violence arising from the inability of emerging political systems to 
contain protest. This danger was predominantly described in ethnic, clan (and other 
forms of tribal and familial affinity) and regional terms in Central Asia, although 
the distinctions between these different categories are often obscure due to their 
                                                        
13 M. Mann, 'The autonomous power of the state: its origins, mechanisms and results'. Archives 
Européennes de Sociologie 25, (1983), 187-213. 
14 For an example of this connection in a study of the wider post-Soviet region see T.W. Simons, 
Eurasia’s new frontiers. Young states, old societies, open futures, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008). 
15 See, inter alia, R. Bova, ‘Democratisation and the crisis of the Russian state’, in G. Smith (ed.) State-
building in Russia. The Yeltsin legacy and the challenge of the future (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 17-
40; V. Sperling ‘Introduction: the domestic and international obstacles to state-building in Russia’, in 
V. Sperling (ed.) Building the Russian state. Institutional crisis and the quest for democratic governance, 
(Boulder: Westview, 2000), 1-23. 
16 P. Luong Jones, ‘Introduction. Politics in the periphery: competing views of Central Asian states 
and societies’ in P. Luong Jones (ed.), The transformation of Central Asia. States and societies from Soviet 
rule to independence, (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2004), 11. 
17 D. Blum ‘Conclusion: is disintegration inevitable and why should we care?’ in D. Blum (ed.) Russia’s 
future. Consolidation or disintegration? (Boulder: Westview, 1994), 147-8. 
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overlap.18 The very act of state building, in particular the ideational dimensions 
involved in creating some form of citizenship around which state and reform 
mobilisation could be based, would, it was believed, provoke ethnic hostilities. 
These ethnic hostilities had been largely hidden under Soviet rule until perestroika 
had reactivated them as actual or potential sources of political and social 
mobilisation. Ethnic identities had been a source of violence as the USSR collapsed, 
most notably in Nagorno-Karabakh but also in Central Asia where there had been 
clashes over land rights between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks around the city of Osh in the 
Ferghana valley, where Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan intersect.19 Post-
Soviet state building, it was believed, would reinforce emergent ethnic identities 
and set them against one another even more as the process of creating state 
citizenship would inevitably marginalise some ethnic identities. Indeed, it was 
posited that the very fact of independence created a surge of ethnic tension because 
independence shifted relations of domination that had existed in the Soviet period 
down a level: Russian ethnic domination was automatically replaced by the 
domination of titular nationalities (that is the nationality around which Soviet 
republics had been formed) so that new hierarchies of domination and resistance 
were formed.20 What was true of ethnic domination was also true of regional and 
clan patterns of domination. Ethnicity, however, was seen as especially dangerous 
because all of the Central Asian states had highly mixed ethnic populations and 
because there was a ‘disjuncture between state and national boundaries’ due to the 
arbitrary establishment of republican borders.21 The republics of Central Asia from 
which the new states were formed had been created were largely artificial creations 
of the Soviet colonial power in the late 1920s and early 1930s. This solidified notions 
of ethnicity that had often been loose and malleable, and frequently turned them 
against each other, rather than against Moscow, as different ethnic groups worked 
to distinguish themselves from one another and ensure their dominance in the 
republic of which they were the titular nationality. Moreover, borders made no 
concessions to ethnic affinities or economic rationality. The new republics, and 
hence their successor states, were left with far larger minority groups than might 
                                                        
18 Indeed clans have been described as a form of sub-ethnic group. See K. Collins, ‘Clans, pacts and 
politics in Central Asia’, Journal of Democracy, 13 (2002), 137-152. For other assessments see E. Schatz, 
Modern clan politics and beyond. The power of ‘blood’ in Kazakhstan, (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2004), D. Gulette, ‘Theories on Central Asian factionalism: the debate in political 
science and its wider implications’, Central Asian Survey, 26 (2007), 373-387. 
19 On the Osh conflict see V. Tishkov, Ethnicity, nationalism and conflict in and after the Soviet Union. The 
mind aflame, (London: Sage, 1997), chapter 7. 
20 I. Bremmer, ‘Post-Soviet nationalities theory: past, present, and future’, in I. Bremmer and R. Taras 
(eds), New states, new politics. Building the post-Soviet nations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 19. 
21 R. Menon and H. Spruyt, ‘Possibilities for conflict and conflict resolution in post-Soviet Central 
Asia’, in B. Rubin and J. Snyder (eds), Post-Soviet political order. Conflict and state building, (London: 
Routledge, 1998), 112. 
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have been the case and were weakened economically by the arbitrary division of 
what had previously been common economic spaces.22 
 
There were consequently multiple points of potential conflict within former USSR 
and Central Asia in particular. In Central Asia these problems were particularly 
talked up because the regimes there were defined as ‘nationalising’ due to the 
absence of any prior historical national identity that could be drawn on to 
consolidate stateness in the region.23 In short, because they had farther to go to 
define themselves as states the potential for conflict in their unfinished democracies 
looked that much greater. There were fears that that mobilisation of ethnicity would 
be a strategy adopted by elites trying to compensate for weak democratic and 
systemic legitimacy, or to try to force their way in to (or out of) the political system 
by playing the nationalist card.24 The multi-ethnic nature of the states of the region 
and the large potential for conflict envisaged as a result made the prospect of this 
mobilisation more dangerous and likely. Conflicts over state-building in one nation 
might spill over and draw in outside powers tempted to shore up their regimes by 
protecting their fellow ethnics across some historically poorly defined border. In the 
words of one analyst, there was a danger that the region would move from being a 
‘melting pot’ to a ‘cauldron’.25 There were also a large Russian diaspora across the 
former USSR and fears that there would be mobilisation in Russia to protect this 
diaspora. On top of this it was sometimes asserted that Russia would have difficulty 
adjusting to its new status as a post-imperial power; this might lead it to adopt a 
more aggressive foreign policy as it sought to compensate for its loss of status and 
as leaders mobilised around nationalist issues to contain popular resentment at the 
loss of national authority and power.26  
 
All told then, Central Asia and Russia seemed to be a perfect breeding ground for 
violence as weak democracies (at best) and as nationalising states searching for an 
identity and rallying ideology. Russia’s failure to consolidate its democracy, the 
mobilisation of nationalist forces from both right and left in opposition to reform, 
                                                        
22 A good brief description can be found in O. Roy, The new Central Asia. The creation of nations, 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 61-78. 
23 A. Bohr, ‘The Central Asian states as nationalising regimes’, in G. Smith (ed.), Nation-building in the 
post-Soviet borderlands: the politics of national identities, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
139-166. 
24 Tishkov, Ethnicity, nationalism and conflict, chapter 11. 
25 S. Akiner, ‘Melting pot, salad bowl – cauldron? Manipulation and mobilisation of ethnic and 
religious identities in Central Asia’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 20, (1997), 362-398. 
26 On Russia as a post-imperial power and the possibilities of this driving a more aggressive foreign 
policy see A. Motyl, ‘After empire: competing discourses and inter-state conflict in post-imperial 
Eastern Europe’, in B. Rubin and J. Snyder (eds), Post-Soviet political order. Conflict and state building, 
(London: Routledge, 1998), 14-33). In fact whilst elites were sometimes aggressive in their attitudes the 
dominant sentiment in the 1990s amongst most of the Russian people toward isolationism rather than 
aggression. See W. Zimmerman, The Russian people and foreign policy: Russian elite and mass perspectives, 
1993-2000, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). 
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the large vote share given to ultra-nationalist parties like Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s 
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia in elections in 1993 and 1995, as well as the Tajik 
civil war and the Russian invasion of Chechnya at the end of 1994, all seemed to 
confirm that the semi-democracies of the region were promoting conflict at worse, 
or at best barely containing it. This brought in to play the second assumption that 
has underlain expectations about conflict in the region, the state assumption. If 
democracies could not stabilise and contain conflict, and if the new polities of the 
area could no create political systems that could manage reform then there was the 
danger that they would fail to generate the state capacity needed to manage society. 
There were two possible outcomes from this.  
 
First, anocracy would endure. This might not mean conflict and violence, but it 
would mean that conflict and violence could not ever be ruled out: enduring liberal 
peace would not be built. As Gail Lapidus has put it, whilst predictions about 
communal violence have not by and large come true, ‘the potential for future 
conflict remains high’ because of a ‘striking failure to create strong and efficacious 
states where the rule of law and the protection of minorities are not only enshrined 
in institutions and law but also assimilated in the dominant political culture and 
patterns of behaviour.’27 
 
Second, and far worse, was the prospect that in the absence of strong states being 
built state failure would occur. State failure by its very definition involves intra-
state conflict and potentially leads to the exportation of this conflict to neighbours 
and/or a diminution of their economic capacity, which in turn can impact their 
existence as states.28 Its civil war meant that Tajikistan failed as a state before it was 
even really instituted as an independent state and there has been speculation since 
about the prospects of Russia and other Central Asian states failing (or in 
Tajikistan’s case failing for a second time).  
 
This speculation grew as interest in the role of failed states in international politics 
expanded after 9/11 and partly, as there was a failure to develop states in the 
region through democracy promotion and economic reform. Increased attention to 
the problems created by failed states after 9/11 led to various measures of state 
failure being constructed and studies conducted to spot the next failed state. These 
indices and studies, like The Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index, the World Bank’s 
‘fragile states’ or ‘Low Income Countries under Stress’ studies, George Mason 
University’s Political Instability Taskforce ‘state failure’ project, or The Brookings 
                                                        
27 G.W. Lapidus ‘Ethnicity and state-building: accommodating ethnic differences in post-Soviet 
Eurasia’, in M. Beissinger and C. Young (eds), Beyond state crisis? Postcolonial Africa and post-Soviet 
Eurasia in comparative perspective, (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002), 353. 
28 P. Collier, The bottom billion. Why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), chapter 4. 
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Institution’s Index of state weakness in the developing world, generally list one or more 
of the Central Asian states on their ‘at danger’ lists or as very weak states, and they 
frequently score low on political and economic measures.29 All the Central Asian 
states are listed in Paul Collier’s ‘bottom billion’ list of borderline and already failed 
states.30 More specifically there have been a number of studies that have analysed 
developments in Russia and Central Asia as leading them to, or raising the prospect 
of state failure. The economic crisis of 1998 in Russia, for example, was described as 
creating the conditions in which state failure might occur.31 Prophecies of failure are 
even more common for Central Asia. A core assumption of the failed state concept 
is that weak states can be pushed over the edge and in to failure by any kind of 
crisis, political economic, natural disaster, or an event that elsewhere would be 
innocuous. Such precipitating events of failure can be domestic or international in 
origin. All post-Soviet states have been described as weak from both domestic and 
international perspectives.32 The problem is magnified for post-Soviet Central Asia 
due to its border with Afghanistan and the possibility of the conflicts there spilling 
over. This creates an obvious source of potential state failure, especially since cross-
border incursions played a role in the Tajik civil war, and Afghanistan was a base 
for the IMU and its incursions in to the region before the defeat of the Taliban.33 
However since more or less any event can lead a weak state to failure the prospect 
of failure can be constantly invoked. Political succession, economic problems, 
environmental issues, events such as the killings in Andijan, etc. can all be talked of 
as precursors of state failure and the conflicts and spillover violence that would 
follow. These prophecies are most commonly invoked for Tajikistan, Uzbekistan 
and Kyrgyzstan, where the combination of poverty (particularly for Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan) and high levels of political repression (particularly for Uzbekistan but 
intermittently for the other two) means that they score particularly poorly on 
measures of state weakness.34 
                                                        
29 The Failed States Index is available through the Fund for Peace’s web pages at 
http://www.fundforpeace.org/. The World Bank research on fragile states can be accessed through 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/STRATEGIES/EXTLICUS/0,,content
MDK:20247661~menuPK:4168000~pagePK:64171540~piPK:64171528~theSitePK:511778,00.html. The 
Political Instability Taskforce datasets on failed states and related research can be found at 
http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/. For The Brookings Institution index see S.E. Rice and S. Patrick, 
Index of state weakness in the developing world, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008). 
30 Collier, Wars, guns and votes, 239-240 
31 D. Hoffman, ‘Russia is sinking into the void of a “failed state”’, International Herald Tribune, (27 
February, 1999), 1; G. Herd, ‘ Russia: systemic transformation or Federal collapse?’, Journal of Peace 
Research, 36 (1999), 259-269. For a general discussion of some of the issues around a Russian 
breakdown see H.E. Hale and R. Taagepera, ‘Russia: consolidation or collapse?’, Europe-Asia Studies, 54 
(2002), 1101-1125. 
32 A.P. Tsygankov, ‘Modern at last? Variety of weak states in the post-Soviet world’, Communist and 
Post-Communist Studies, 40 (2007), 423-439. 
33 B. Rubin, ‘Central Asia wars and ethnic conflicts – rebuilding failed states’, Human Development 
Report Office Occasional Paper, (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2004). 
34 See, inter alia, International Crisis Group, ‘Kyrgyzstan: a faltering state’, Asia Report, 109, (2005), 
‘Kyrgyzstan on the edge’, Asia Briefing, 55, (2006), Uzbekistan: Stagnation and Uncertainty, Asia 
Briefing, 67 (2007), and, ‘Tajikistan: on the road to failure’, Asia Report, 162 (2009), J. Engvall. 
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The false premises of expectations 
 
Expectations of conflict have thus outstripped the level of conflict in the post-Soviet 
space. What is holding the region back from falling into the conflict traps that 
commonly beset poor (in all senses of the word) democracies and weak states? This 
section posits two reasons why conflict has not been as widespread as expected. 
First, the ideas underpinning the regime and state assumptions about conflict are 
faulty, or at least not as absolute and watertight as explanations or predictive 
theories as they might seem. Consequently we can question their application to the 
area. Second, there are some crucial differences between Central Asia and Russia, 
and other weak democracies and states, which have kept the former (relatively) 
conflict free. 
 
There has not been a straightforward translation of regime type and state weakness 
in to conflict in the area is that the relationship between regime, state and conflict 
needs to be qualified generally. Anocracy is arguably no more associated with civil 
war than any other form of regime.35 This raises the issue of reverse causality: it is 
not regime form that determines political violence in the case of anocracies, but 
political violence that creates anocracies and this may lead to civil war. Absent 
political violence and a semi-democracy is no more likely to collapse into violence 
than any other regime. This puts a new spin on the prospects of avoiding conflict in 
Russia and Central Asia since political violence (repression excepted), as opposed to 
violence driven by economic motives (crime), has been low. The collapse of the 
USSR was, as many studies have noted, remarkably free of violence in comparison 
to the collapse of other empires and in comparison to the collapse of the other main 
federal communist state, Yugoslavia.36 Outside of the Chechen and Tajik cases 
violence at the moment that the USSR collapsed did not generally beget violence, 
nor was it the source of weak democracies. The other conflicts that had already 
broken out in Georgia and between Azerbaijan and Armenia before the USSR’s 
collapse either froze with the collapse of the USSR or at least began to wind down to 
a considerable extent. It would be hard to say that this freeze weakened democracy 
in the region, and until the Georgian-Russian conflict it had not led to war. Georgia, 
Moldova, Azerbaijan and Armenia would not have had much smoother a transition 
                                                                                                                                                            
Kyrgyzstan: the Anatomy of a Failed State, (Uppsala: Central Asia Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies 
Program, 2006), R.M. Auty ‘Transition to mid-income democracies or to failed states?’, in R.M. Auty 
and I. de Soysa (eds) Energy, wealth and governance in the Caucasus and Central Asia, (London: Routledge, 
2006), 3-16. 
35 J.R. Vreeland, ‘The effect of political regime on civil war: unpacking anocracy’, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 52 (2008), 401-425. 
36 For example, D. Lieven, ‘Empire’s aftermath: a comparative perspective’, in S.N. Cummings (ed.), 
Power and change in Central Asia, (London: Routledge, 2002), 24-41. 
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to democracy if they had settled their border disputes; Tajikistan was not destined 
for democracy if it had not had a civil war and Russia’s erratic democratisation 
would have been erratic with or without Chechnya. Democratic weakness in the 
region had other, multiple sources but these do not seem to have been responsible 
for generating conflict. Indeed, one could argue the opposite has often been the 
case. Democracy has been weakened in part so that conflict can be contained and 
avoided. The reason for this is not altruistic on the part of rulers in the area. They 
have simply been trying to consolidate their power and head off threats to it and 
their repression of violence is no different in this regard to the suppression of 
pluralism. Leaders have thus learnt from the past and contained conflict. All the 
leaders of the region learnt from the Ferghana valley conflicts during perestroika, 
from the fates of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and from the war in Tajikistan, 
that conflicts might be latent in the region, and can threaten retention of power as 
they did in Georgia and Azerbaijan in particular. The settlement of the Tajik conflict 
has lead to the construction of a non-democratic regime in order to try to maintain 
peace rather than the democratic settlement called for by international agencies 
charged with securing the peace. Such a settlement would in theory consolidate 
peace since stability and its benefits would come from the construction of a 
legitimate political order. However on the ground this has been achieved via an 
‘illiberal’ deal that has worked to contain conflict.37 
 
The construction of non-democratic political regimes in the post-Soviet space has 
not, therefore, bred conflict as the literature might lead us to expect. As will be 
argued below, the opposite may well be the case. There are similar problems with 
the idea that state weakness is a precursor to conflict and its application to the post-
Soviet space. The dividing line between what constitutes a weak state and a failed 
one is conceptually unclear. The extent of conceptual confusion can be seen in the 
different terms and definitions of weak and failed states: for some analysts a state 
that does not deliver public goods is a failed state, for others it is merely weak; for 
some there is a difference between a failed state, where there is conflict over 
political order, and a collapsed sate, where that order has evaporated, for others not 
since both experience political violence and contests over the right to monopolise 
violence.38 Not surprisingly, therefore, there is no common set of ideas 
underpinning expectations of conflict emerging from weak states to turn them in to 
failed or collapsed states, or even states just further weakened by violence. Instead 
expectations that there will be conflict in weak states combine analogies and a 
structural reading of how the international system affects weak states.  
 
                                                        
37 Heathershaw, Post-conflict Tajikistan, especially 172-179. 
38 For a discussion of these issues and their origins see N. Robinson, ‘State-building and international 
politics: the emergence of a “new” problem and agenda’, in A. Hehir and N. Robinson (eds), State-
building. Theory and practice, (London: Routledge, 2007), 1-28. 
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The structural reading of how the international system affects weak states contrasts 
the Cold War and post-Cold war international systems and how they create or 
destroy conditions that enable weak states to survive without falling in to conflict. 
The argument here is that the bipolar competition of the Cold War years generated 
resources and substituted for state building in some parts of the world so that 
conflict was contained to some extent. Where there was still conflict it had state-like 
attributes – warring factions had a state project and a mobilising ideology – thanks 
to their sponsorship by the capitalist West or the socialist East. Conflicts and wars 
were therefore not as common as might have been expected and normal; even when 
they were civil wars they were forms of state-to-state conflict by proxy. The end of 
the Cold War and bipolarity, and the failure of a new world order to build an 
effective and legitimate state system and system of intervention has meant that 
there are more conflicts and they are more intractable because their nature has 
changed. With the end of the Cold War the costs of violence in weak states declined 
to the outside world so there was less international pressure to control and contain 
it.39 At the same time the security rents that weak states got from their sponsors 
disappeared, as did other financial aid that had flowed to them because of the Cold 
War.40 With less outside constraint and a revenue squeeze the result was conflict as 
groups competed for scare resources. Consequently, the form of this conflict was 
‘new wars’, ‘resource wars’ etc, where struggles centred on controlling resources 
that were easy to appropriate, and where conflict was more intractable because 
combatants did not want to surrender seized resources or were desperate to seize 
their share.41 This pattern theoretically applies where ever there are weak states 
since the end of the Cold War and bipolarity are systemic changes that apply across 
the international system.42 The proof of this structural reading of the security 
dilemmas facing weak states consists of analogies. Initially the analogies drawn 
were to the former Yugoslavia and its wars. Increasingly, however, the analogy 
drawn has been between Central Asia and Africa. Central Asia (and sometimes the 
post-Soviet space more generally) and Africa are said to share certain characteristics 
that make them prone to state failure.43 These shared characteristics have already 
                                                        
39 R.H. Bates, Prosperity and violence. The political economy of development, (New York: Norton, 2001), 97-
100. 
40 M. Ayoob ‘State-making, state-breaking and state failure: explaining the roots of Third World 
insecurity’ in L. Van de Goor, K. Rupeshinge and P. Sciarone (eds), Between development and destruction: 
an enquiry into the causes of conflict in post-colonial states, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 67-86, and the 
arguments listed in N. van de Walle, ‘The economic correlates of state failure: taxes, foreign aid, and 
policies’, in R. Rotberg, (ed.), When states fail. Causes and consequences, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2004), 108. 
41 M. Duffield, Global governance and the new wars: the merging of development and security, (London, Zed 
Books, 2001); M. Kaldor, New and old wars. Organized violence in a global era, (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2007, second edition). 
42 For such a global perspective see P.G. Cerny, Rethinking world politics: a theory of transnational 
neopluralism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), chapter 11. 
43 Rubin, ‘Central Asia wars and ethnic conflicts’ makes a long comparison of Central Asia and Africa, 
particularly the Great Lakes region. Other comparisons between Africa and the post-Soviet space more 
generally, including Central Asia and Russia, can be found in M.R. Beissinger and C. Young, (eds.) 
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been referred to above; they are the same features of Central Asia that help to 
weaken them as democracies and states: their arbitrary borders that create complex 
ethnic mixes, post-colonial economic deformations, absence of a pre-colonial state 
history, forms of tribalism and sub-ethnic clan affinities etc. Since these led to 
conflict in Africa – in Somalia, the Great Lakes region, Liberia, Sierra Leone etc. – 
they are expected to have an analogous impact in the post-Soviet region.  
 
These analogies are, however, just that, analogies, and are not watertight 
explanations, and the grounds on which they are made is not that secure. It is 
debatable whether there is any more conflict now than in the recent past. The Cold 
War may have been a the ‘Long Peace’, as John Lewis Gaddis put it, in North 
America and Europe, but not elsewhere in the world.44 Arguably – it depends in 
part on what counts as war – there is now less conflict than there was during the 
Cold War.45 There is no space to evaluate claims about the incidence of war before 
and after 1991 here, but the fact that the issue can be raised throws some doubt on 
any simple assumption that structural changes to the international system translate 
into more wars or create greater risk of conflict in areas that have characteristics that 
we might expect to lead to conflict. Indeed, it is possible argue that the problem is 
not the post-Cold war international system but the process of getting to that system. 
The end of the old system caused by the collapse of some of the states that formed it 
rather than the post-Cold War order caused conflict that has died down as the new 
order has taken shape. The wars in former Yugoslavia and the war in Tajikistan 
would be cases in point. These conflicts were not caused by post-Cold War 
multipolarity but (in part) by the events that lead to the collapse of bipolarity. 
Moreover, once the shift from one form of international balance of power was 
completed these wars also ended. 
 
 
Avoiding conflict in the post-Soviet space: the distinction between 
state and regime building 
 
There are thus good grounds to doubt the strength of the link between changes 
internationally and the outbreak of war or its increased durability generally, let 
alone in the post-Soviet space, and to doubt that there is an automatic progression 
                                                                                                                                                            
Beyond state crisis? Post-colonial Africa and post-Soviet Eurasia in comparative perspective, (Washington, 
DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002). See in particular the editors’ chapter, ‘Convergence to crisis: 
pre-independence state legacies and post-independence state breakdown in Africa and Eurasia’, C.H. 
Fairbanks, Jr., ‘Weak states and private armies’, and D. Holloway and S.J. Stedman. ‘Civil wars and 
state-building in Africa and Eurasia’. 
44 J. Lewis Gaddis, The long peace: inquiries into the history of the Cold War, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1989). On the great power, European bias in some of Gaddis’s work that is mirrored in the idea 
that the end of the Cold War created conflict in the Third Wold, see T. Judt, Reappraisals. Reflections on 
the forgotten twentieth century, (London: Penguin, 2009), 368-383. 
45 Collier, War, guns and votes, 4-5. 
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from weak democracy and weak statehood to conflict. Even if there were not it 
would not automatically be the case that more conflict in some parts of the world 
because of the end of the Cold War or because of weak democracy/statehood 
should mean that the same conditions that spark these conflicts pertain in large 
parts of the former USSR. The development of weak democracy (at best) is not a 
cause of conflict in the former USSR, but has so far constrained it. Likewise the 
weakness of post-Soviet states is not – or at least not yet – a source of instability, 
rather it is a result of regime building strategies that have controlled conflict. The 
post-Soviet space has, therefore, for the most part departed from the widely 
accepted norms about state, regime and conflict. It has done this because of the 
success of many post-Soviet leaders in substituting regime building for state 
building, a success that is based on Soviet legacies, patrimonial political economy 
and a particular security environment. These have enabled post-Soviet leaders to 
trade state building off against regime building. To understand this we must first 
understand that there are differences between state and regime building and how 
they can be traded off against each other. 
 
State and regime building are related processes. However, whilst building a state 
implies the construction of a regime,46 constructing a regime does not always lead to 
the development of a strong state, one that has a capacity to make policy and enact 
it so as to provide welfare and security to its people, or indeed to the development 
of any great state capacity at all. This is because state building and regime building 
have different criteria for success and failure, and need not be complimentary even 
if they affect one another. A regime may be consolidated when elites achieve a set of 
political rules that they cannot change without incurring a disproportionate cost to 
themselves. A state formation is consolidated when officials have the ability and 
resources to perform state functions of maintaining order and security. The 
essential difference between state and regime therefore, is that state formation is not 
just a matter of elite competition whereas in the short-term regime formation may 
be just that, a matter of elite struggle during which elites may or may not, according 
to circumstance, respond to or ignore state building pressures. States as functional 
(albeit unconscious) structures have some interest autonomous of elites, in 
particular they have an interest in international competition and domestic order, 
and this makes them, in Skocpol’s classic formulation, an ‘autonomous structure - a 
structure with a logic and interests of its own not necessarily equivalent to, or fused 
with, the interests of the dominant class in society or the full set of member groups 
in the polity’.47 The degree to which states are autonomous ‘can come and go’, as 
                                                        
46 The regime built in the course of constructing a state may not necessarily be the regime that was 
intended to manage the new state. Soviet history shows this very well. The Bolsheviks built a state but 
the regime that dominated it was very different to what they had initially intended. 
47 T. Skocpol, States and social revolutions. A comparative analysis of France, Russia and China, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), 27. 
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Skocpol later put it, since the structural potential for autonomous action - as well as 
stimulus for it – can vary over time and from state sector to state sector.48 Pressure 
to develop the state can come from one, few, or all of a state’s composite officials 
and institutions, or be brought to bear on them from society. But no matter where 
the pressure comes from, state formation involves first, more complex tasks of 
social and economic management than regime formation; keeping order generally 
requires organisation and resources additional to those needed to keep order 
among competing elites, and gathering these resources may strain elite agreements 
about the economic basis of a regime. Second, state formation has an international 
dimension to it that is structural. Traditional security concerns – real and perceived 
- are still an issue in many parts of the post-communist world, and states still need 
to develop as military and extractive structures to cope with security demands. This 
creates pressures for state development. Where these pressures are absent is equally 
telling. If such pressures are absent, there is a possibility that a regime might 
develop without having to pay much attention to state development. This would 
mean that state and regime might be stable, despite state weakness and inability to 
deal with transformation tasks. 
 
State building over time thus influences regime stability, but in the short-run 
regime formation primarily involves elites and is determined by their interaction, 
the pressures upon them and the environment in which they interact. Regime 
building may overlap with state building as an elite may try to prop up its preferred 
regime by delivering greater state capacity and public goods. Alternately, regime 
building might substitute for state building as elites capture rather than develop the 
state. Both strategies can be successful but over the longer term, the better 
developed a state the more likely there is to government stability and hence regime 
stability since continuity of governments, or at least their regularised replacement, 
is less likely to call in to question the basis on which power is accessed and used. 
How long this ‘long term’ is depends on the pressures that a country has to deal 
with. Where pressures are great supplanting regime for state building will be 
dangerous, especially if the state has low capacity to begin with. A regime in a state 
with high capacity has more resources to deploy, better chances of extracting extra 
resources to deal with problems, and potentially more and broader reserves of 
political loyalty to fall back on because it is able to deliver a wider range of public 
goods through the state. Moreover, there is less chance of political fragmentation if 
the delivery of these goods is not directly from the regime but is filtered through a 
state with capacity rather than delivered through some faction of a regime. Where 
states deliver public goods they can be rationed in times of crisis or shortage; where 
delivery of goods is personalised through connection to the regime there is more 
                                                        
48 T. Skocpol,  ‘Bringing the state back in: strategies of analysis in current research’, in P. Evans, D. 
Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol, (eds) Bringing the state back in, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984), 14. 
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chance of political contestation because power within a regime depends on ability 
to deliver resources so that they become objects of struggle between regime groups 
or unevenly distributed so that regime legitimacy declines. 
 
The consolidation of a state formation in post-communism is potentially a far more 
difficult thing to achieve than the consolidation of a regime since managing the 
classic state functions of social order and national security involves questions of 
borders, citizenship, and the establishment of new forms of economic exchange and 
rules to govern them. A regime may be consolidated before a state develops that 
can resolve the problems of post-communist reconstruction and fulfil the classic 
functions of a state easily. If this occurs, the question before a regime is can it 
contain and ameliorate the problems of reconstruction and maintaining social order 
and national security in such a way that it can survive ruling through a weak (i.e., 
one that cannot resolve post-communist transformation or traditional state tasks) 
state? If a regime cannot contain or ameliorate these pressures some other way (for 
example by gaining aid or security guarantees from other states) then it will come 
under pressure to evolve further and to develop the state. Where this pressure 
exists and is not responded to the long-term viability of a regime will be open to 
question. The viability of a regime in these circumstances may be called into 
question from below or from within the state as pressure to take action grows in 
reaction to perceived threats to the interests of state officials and to their ability to 
perform basic state functions of maintaining order and security. 
 
Regime building at the expense of state building is thus in all probability a short-
term solution to problems of consolidating and maintaining political order, 
although as a short-term it may run for some time. Substituting regime for state 
building has two main dimensions to it. First, there are state building issues 
involving questions of identity, of citizenship, and borders. These are obviously 
important to new states and may be particularly important for controlling the extent 
and intensity of potential ethnic unrest. Favouring regime over state building has 
meant either that such state building projects have been weakened, or at least that 
they are weak at crucial moments of time when they might be more disruptive and 
conflict prone. Second, there is the issue of elite stability in the face of reforms to 
build up the capacity of the state as an administrative and economic actor. This may 
have ethnic dimensions but the issue that we will deal with here is primarily that of 
central elite stability and central-local elite relations. Reform and the development 
of state capacity means the alteration of existing power relations, the redistribution 
of power amongst elites to, what for them, may be uncertain – and hence 
undesirable – ends, especially where political power is a prerequisite for economic 
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affluence.49 Where regime building is favoured over state building, balancing power 
and ensuring that economic power is maintained will be as, and generally more, 
important than passing power from elites and social groups to state institutions and 
developing the state to promote such things as economic growth that will change 
the balance of economic fortune and power. The forms of conflict that are 
potentially involved here may be less extensive and bloody than communal 
violence, since they may be more focussed as coups, conflicts over election results 
etc. However these are potentially structurally violent in that they may damage the 
economic fortunes of a nation, and often lead to wider conflict.50 Over and above 
these two dimensions of state and regime building hovers the questions of why 
state building can be traded off in favour of regime building and for how long. 
 
 
Avoiding conflict in the post-Soviet space: state and regime 
building practices 
 
State building as a process of identity formation involving the development of 
citizenship through such things as language and education policies, and the 
creation of new political and economic borders was responsible for the breakdown 
of peace at the end of the USSR, and subsequently for the perpetuation of conflict in 
the Caucasus and in Moldova, and have brought protest, if not sustained violence, 
to the Crimea. Sometimes conflict was actively provoked by a state building effort - 
as in Georgia under Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who attempted to develop a notion of 
Georgian statehood and citizenship as part of the independence struggle with the 
USSR, or more recently under Mikheil Saakashvili, who returned to the politics of 
state building after the interregnum under Eduard Shevardnadze when state 
building efforts were sidetracked.51 Sometimes the mere threat of a state building 
project was enough to create a pre-emptive backlash, as in Moldova, where the 
population of Transdniestria feared some form of ‘Romanianisation’ either through 
the reintegration of Moldova with Romania or via the development of an 
independent Moldovan state. 52 In both the Caucasus and Moldova this violent 
reaction to state building was facilitated by Soviet federal structure, particularly the 
existence of autonomous republics and regions – Transdniestria, Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia, Adjara – within larger Soviet republics that were in the process of emerging 
                                                        
49 For the theory behind this see B. Geddes, Politician’s dilemma. Building state capacity in Latin America, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 1-42. 
50 On structural violence see J. Galtung, ‘ Violence, peace, and peace research’, Journal of Peace 
Research, 6 (1969), 167-191. On the economic affects of coups and their potential to lead to further 
conflict see Collier, Wars, guns and votes, 142, 152-154. 
51 J. Wheatley, ‘Managing ethnic diversity in Georgia: one step forward, two steps back.’ Central Asian 
Survey, 28 (2009), 119–134;  J.A.  George, ‘The dangers of reform: state building and national minorities 
in Georgia’, Central Asian Survey, 28 (2009), 135-154 
52 On the manipulation of language and cultural issues in Moldova see S. Roper, ‘Regionalism in 
Moldova: the case of Transnistria and Gaugazia’, Regional & Federal Studies 11 (2001), 101-22. 
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as new states. The existence of these sub-republican federal units gave elites 
objecting to state building projects a framework through which to mobilise and 
create alternative krypto-states of their own, especially since they could appeal to 
the still existing Soviet centre for protection of their federal rights.53 Appealing to 
Moscow enabled them to protest emerging national citizenship by appeal to the 
greater Soviet identity of which they were still a part and that (at least in Soviet 
nationality theory) protected their local identity.  
 
Conflict along these lines and through Soviet federal structures was not, however, 
universal since state building projects were not equally recognised or given an 
ethnic character at key moments of crisis. In Russia any idea that a Russian national 
identity might be emerging as the USSR collapsed was ameliorated by the poor 
electoral showing of Russian nationalists, who were largely tied to the declining 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union intellectually.54 Second, the rhetoric of 
Russian opposition was not nationalist since it often downplayed the issue of 
succession. This is best demonstrated by Boris Yeltsin’s famous call for the 
autonomous republics and regions to ‘take as much sovereignty as you can 
swallow’, and assiduous courting of these autonomous areas as allies in the struggle 
with Moscow.55 With the exception of Chechnya (and there are several ways in 
which Chechnya can be seen as exceptional) the break-up of the USSR did not 
provoke ethno-nationalist collapse in Russia since no state building project was in 
place as collapse took place, but only emerged after it and then weakly. The stress 
in official Russian discourses on citizenship is placed on non-ethnic Russian 
(rossiiskii) citizenship rather than ethnic Russianness (russkii). The compromises 
over centre-federal relations and the development of an asymmetric federalism 
under Yeltsin that allowed for the political ambitions and power of regional elites 
was a crucial factor in the weakening of Russian economic reform, which was at the 
heart of Yeltsin’s efforts to build up state power relative to that of elite groups.56  
Regime stability - keeping Yeltsin in power; protecting the power of economic 
groups from perceived threats from the Communist Party of the Russian 
Federation; and maintaining the balance of power between centre and federal units 
– thus out-weighed state building in Russia. Although there was often a push for 
                                                        
53 On the importance of Soviet federal arrangements see J.A. George, ‘Expecting ethnic conflict. The 
Soviet legacy and ethnic politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia’, in A.E. Wooden and C.H. Stefes 
(eds), The politics of transition in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Enduring legacies and emerging challenges, 
(London: Routledge, 2009), 75-102. 
54 K. O’Connor, Intellectuals and apparatchiks. Russian nationalism and the Gorbachev revolution, (Lanham, 
Lexington Books, 2006). 
55 T.J. Colton, Yeltsin. A life, (New York, Basic Books, 2008), 186-187. 
56 On asymmetric federalism and the management of secession in Russia generally see M. Crosston, 
Shadow separatism. Implications for democratic consolidation, (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2004), J. Hughes, 
‘Managing secession potential in the Russian Federation’, Regional & Federal Studies 11 (2001), 36-68. 
On economic reform as state building in Russia, and its compromise see N. Robinson, Russia. A state of 
uncertainty, (London, Routledge, 2002), 102-131. 
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secession from below in Russia’s autonomous republics,57 the weakness of the 
federal centre and its willingness to compromise its policies meant that local leaders 
could mediate between centre and republic to moderate demands from below and 
transform them in to resource flows from the centre.58 
 
Similar patterns can be seen elsewhere in the former USSR. In Ukraine secessionist 
tendencies were balanced by the political dominance of Leonid Kravchuk in the 
early 1990s, who eschewed secession as a central plank of his politics until the USSR 
was already effectively dead. Thereafter threats of ethnic conflict where diffused in 
the potential flashpoint of the Crimea by policies of accommodation and power 
devolution.59 In Central Asia, there was no mass movement to secession and 
political leadership in the republics worked to control nationalism. In this they were 
very mindful of the potential for conflict in the area. In Uzbekistan, for example, the 
main secessionist movement, Birlik, was pushed aside and its repressions 
legitimised by of fears violence in the Ferghana valley.60 The relative absence of 
nationalist rhetoric, and for many Central Asian elites the absence of a desire for 
secession, in the secession process made it harder for post-Soviet leaders in Central 
Asia – as elsewhere - to drape themselves fully in nationalist garb immediately after 
Soviet collapse. Some development of a national identity was inevitable, not least 
because de facto sovereignty had to be addressed and that meant the practical 
management of borders and ethnic minorities. But nationalism was muted and 
reactions to it less extreme than had been the case where nationalism had been used 
as a vehicle for political advancement in the last days of perestroika. Part of the 
reason that reaction was muted was because the outward migration of Russian and 
other Slavs. Part was because, as in Russia, some distinction continued to be drawn 
between ethnicity and citizenship. 61 Although there have been language laws and 
other policies to promote titular ethnic groups, ethnicity has not dominated and 
driven state building projects in the same way that it did in Georgia. The very 
multi-ethnic composition of all of the Central Asian states has played a part in this 
continued Soviet-style separation of ethnicity and citizenship: if ethnicity became 
the basis of citizenship leaders across the region would run the risk of claims to 
citizenship rights being made across borders, and raise the danger of low-key 
localised ethnic disputes becoming inter-state conflicts. Central Asian leaders have 
                                                        
57 E. Giuliano, ‘Secessionism from the bottom up. Democratization, nationalism and local 
accountability in the Russian transition’, World Politics 58 (2006), 276–310. 
58 D. Treisman, ‘Fiscal redistribution in a fragile federation: Moscow and the regions in 1994’, British 
Journal of Political Science, 28 (1998), 185-200 and ‘Deciphering Russia's federal finance: fiscal 
appeasement in 1995 and 1996’ Europe-Asia Studies, 50 (1998), 893-906. 
59 G. Sasse, The Crimea question. Identity, transition, and conflict, (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University 
Press, 2007). 
60 L. Markowitz, ‘How master frames mislead: the division and eclipse of nationalist movements in 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 32 (2009), 716-738. 
61 See Roy, The new Central Asia, 175-177; E. Schatz, ‘Framing strategies and non-conflict in multi-
ethnic Kazakhstan’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 6 (2000), 71-94. 
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been more concerned to guard their sovereignty and the cover that this provides 
them in deciding how to structure their political and economic systems to their own 
advantage to fall in to this trap. They may not have been great state builders, 
therefore, but they have been dedicated to the post-Westphalia ideal of state 
sovereignty. As in Russia, there was also cooptation of regional elites to head off 
opposition. This was less institutionalised than in Russia, but it was still an 
important means of heading off potential threats, especially in the early years of 
independence.62 Later, as power was consolidated in Central Asian regimes, the 
balance between coercion and consensus sometimes changed.63 However, by that 
time the moment of crisis that had allowed conflict to develop in the Caucasus and 
Moldova had passed and the costs of revolt would have been much higher against 
stronger regimes.  
 
State building projects have not, therefore, been strongly nationalistic, or at least 
have not been strongly exclusionary at the most dangerous time for the new states, 
at the moment of their foundation and immediately thereafter. Whilst this lessened 
the risk of communal violence it might have increased the risk of political 
degeneration since it meant that regimes had one less tool at their disposal to bind 
together their populations. Moreover, they ran the risk of nationalism being used to 
mobilise against them. Russia is a case in point, as nationalist and communist forces 
re-emerged as a threat after 1991 and linked up with disaffected members of the 
political elite in parliament in 1993. This alliance plus Yeltsin’s actions against 
parliament combined to create the violent events of October 1993. Countering the 
risk of counter mobilisation meant insuring that elites’ incentives to defect from 
ruling coalitions were minimised. As partial democracies or proto-authoritarian 
regimes at the time of Soviet collapse, and with popular mobilisation generally low, 
other elite groups and members were the chief danger to new rulers: they formed 
the ‘selectorate’, the group with the political resources to remove incumbents, 
which had to be mollified if leaders were to survive politically.64  
 
Insuring the support of their selectorates meant raising the risks attendant on 
opposition. In the main this meant co-option, so that elite groups had too much to 
lose by threatening to break with incumbents or supporting oppositional activity. 
How far a new leadership had to go to raise the risks of opposition and how far it 
had to co-opt elites to support it varied from state to state as the extent of consensus 
                                                        
62 S.N. Cummings, Kazakhstan: centre-periphery relations, London: Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 2000. 
63 For an overview across three states see N.J. Melvin,  ‘Patterns of centre-regional relations in Central 
Asia: the cases of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan’, Regional & Federal Studies 11 
(2001), 165-193. 
64 On selectorates see B. Bueno de Mesquita, A. Smith, R.M. Siverson and J.D. Morrow, The logic of 
political survival, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2003). 
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about the successor regime among elites at the time of collapse varied.65 Conflict 
was most marked where there was no dominant elite view.66 Presidentialism gave 
all leaders some powers and incentives to consolidate regimes but they were not 
able to do so uniformly. In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and to a lesser extent and 
with more effort in Kazakhstan, regimes were onstructed consensually thanks to 
elite continuity, particularly continuity of rulers, continuity of ruling party (as local 
Communist Party organisations were transformed in to new ruling parties), and a 
relatively high degree of continuity of economic and social power.67 In Tajikistan 
there was immediate contestation over the regime caused by the collapse of the 
state and the huge fiscal gap created by the end of Soviet revenue transfers. This led 
to the privatisation of coercion to capture what scare resources were left along 
regional lines and civil war between these armed factions.68  The settlement of the 
civil war gradually led Tajikistan back to the Central Asian norm: the stabilisation 
of the regime around President Imomali Rahmonov ended the contestation over 
power, internalising political struggles within the regime as in other parts of 
Central Asia, and substituting regime powers for state capacity.69 In Kyrgyzstan, the 
presidency of Askar Akaev began as a Central Asia’s great democratic and 
reformist hope but the needs of political survival and struggles over the distribution 
of resources amongst elites soon saw compromise and personalistic politics replace 
efforts at building up a reformist and impersonal state that could carry through 
economic reform in the country.70 
 
                                                        
65 On the variables affecting consensus and division see A. Grzymala-Busse and P. Jones Luong, 
‘Reconceptualising the state: lessons from post-communism’, Politics & Society, 30 (2002), 529-544, V. 
Gel'man,  'Iz ognya da v polymya? Dinamika postsovetskikh rezhimov v sravnitel'noi perspektive', 
Polis (2007), 81-108. 
66 M. McFaul, ‘The fourth wave of democracy and dictatorship: noncooperative transitions in the 
postcommunist world’, in M. McFaul and K. Stoner-Weiss (eds) After the collapse of communism. 
Comparative lessons of transition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 58-95. 
67 There are numerous sources on the continuity of elites and rulers in Central Asia. Essays on early 
moves to consolidate power in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan can be found in T.J. Colton and R.C. 
Tucker, (eds) Patterns in post-Soviet leadership, (Boulder: Westview, 1995). Broader overviews can be see 
G. Gleason, The Central Asian states: discovering independence, (Boulder: Westview, 1997), S.N. 
Cummings (ed.) Power and change in Central Asia, (London: Routledge, 2002), P. Jones Luong, 
Institutional change and political continuity in post-Soviet Central Asia. Power, perceptions, and pacts, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), M. Olcott, Central Asia’s second chance, (Washington, 
DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), and D. Lewis, The temptations of tyranny in 
Central Asia, (London: Hurst, 2008). 
68 L. Markowitz, The micro-foundations of rebellion and repression: rents, patronage, and law-enforcement in 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, (Seattle, The National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, 
2008).  
69 See Gleason, The Central Asian states, M. Atkin, ‘Tajikistan: a president and his rivals’, in Cummings, 
Power and change in Central Asia, 97-114, Lewis, The temptations of tyranny, 161-81, Heathershaw, Post-
conflict Tajikistan. 
70 See the sources in fn. 67 and R.A. Spector, The transformation of Askar Akaev, President of Kyrgyzstan, 
Berkeley: Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, 2004, 
http://repositories.cdlib.org/iseees/bps/2004 02-spec. 
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Regimes therefore emerged in most of Central Asia that dominated and deflected 
state building. In Russia, as in Kyrgyzstan, the process took place over a longer time 
since there was no consensus over the successor regime and struggles over 
economic power. In Russia, as has already been argued, the process of state 
building focussed on economic reform and was derailed in part by compromises 
with regional elites. It was also brought low by compromises with economic elites. 
The difference between the Russian, Tajik and Kyrgyz cases and the more stable 
cases of regime consolidation in the other Central Asian states is explained in part 
by their different initial political conditions, but also by their economic structures 
and sizes. The leaders of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were aided in 
their regime consolidation and had less incentive to reform because of the wealth of 
their natural resources base and/or because the economic structures of their 
countries. These meant that they had resources to distribute, greater control over 
economic sectors such as energy and the cotton economy in Uzbekistan, and spread 
these resources around more easily across what for the most part were smaller 
economies. Cumulatively these made their economies regime supporting so that 
there were few incentives to reform.71 Initial redistribution of property was more 
manageable, not a struggle as in Russia, and regimes adapted their institutional 
structures over time to protect the patrimonial systems that emerged as a result.72 
This did not isolate them from economic downturn in the 1990s, but the regimes 
were strong enough to be able to maintain an unequal division of wealth without 
provoking effective protest.  
 
Economic structure and the closed political systems that it has supported is thus 
one of the reasons that regime building could be used to supplant state building. 
These circumstances are probably unique in much of the contemporary world. The 
massive redistribution of property that went hand-in-hand with the establishment 
of new regimes in the post-Soviet space was probably more extensive than 
redistributions elsewhere, even amongst many post-colonial states. It also took 
place whilst market relations were weak so that it was primarily a political process 
whose outcome was not derailed by market reactions. This gave great power to 
those at the apex of the new political systems and bound elites to them much more 
thoroughly. The political economy of post-communism thus worked for regime 
building in a way that political economies elsewhere in weak democracies/states 
might not. 
                                                        
71 Again, this process was more easily accomplished in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan than 
Kazakhstan and more complete there than in Kyrgyzstan or Russia. See below and the comparisons 
between Russia and the Central Asian states in R.M. Auty and I. de Soysa, ‘Incentives to reform in the 
Caucasus and Central Asian political states’, in R.M. Auty and I. de Soysa (eds) Energy, wealth and 
governance in the Caucasus and Central Asia, (London: Routledge, 2006), 135-151. 
72 A good example of this is the way that there has been manipulation of electoral systems to deal 
with elite changes over time. For a discussion of this in Kazakhstan see R. Isaacs, Between informal and 
formal politics: neopatrimonialism and party development in post-Soviet Kazakhstan, PhD thesis, (Oxford, 
Oxford Brookes University, 2009). 
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External factors also helped. Economically the area was aided by subsidies from 
Russia in the early 1990s, both direct (through transfers and through Russia lifting 
debt burden from them) and indirect (all exported their inflation to Russia). This 
gave them some breathing space in the first years of independence whilst property 
was being distributed amongst elites and regimes consolidated. After the initial 
redistribution of property in the 1990s the stability of regimes in Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan was aided by high energy prices and by 
the growth of Russia’s economy.73  
 
External economic support for regimes has been matched by the security rents that 
post-Soviet regimes have enjoyed.  There has not been an analogous withdrawal of 
great power support from the post-Soviet space as is claimed for Africa.74 Although 
Russia suffered a loss of power, territory and prestige in the wake of the USSR’s 
collapse it did not withdraw as completely from its former ‘colonies’ in the same 
way that some other states (for example Portugal) did during decolonialisation, or 
curtail relations that supported statehood as has been posited for post-Cold War 
Africa. Russia has remained involved in the security of post-Soviet space in various 
ways and to varying degrees, either directly or as a part of some sort of collective 
security arrangement. Indeed, one could argue that there has been a surfeit of 
security arrangements since the collapse of the USSR, some organised multilaterally 
through the Commonwealth of Independent States or with other regional powers 
(such as the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, which includes China with 
Russia and the Central Asian states), some bilaterally between Russia and states in 
the region, such as the 2006 security treaty with Uzbekistan. On top of this there has 
been the involvement of the USA, especially post-9/11 and the war in Afghanistan, 
and NATO (through Partnership for Peace) in the area. This ‘game’ of security in 
Central Asia, as it has been labelled75, has not resolved many of the security issues 
in the region in that it has not resolved the threat of breakdown in Afghanistan nor 
ended the narcotics and other smuggling rackets in the region. However it has 
meant that some of the costs that are expected to fall on weak states when outside 
powers reduce their commitment to them have not been borne by post-Soviet states. 
Their statehood has been guaranteed by international agreement and by Russian 
commitment to the area, no matter that the latter in particular may be self-serving 
and destructive of other aspects of sovereignty.  
                                                        
73 For the relationship between Central Asian economies, energy prices and Russian growth see the 
figures in N. Robinson,  ‘Patrimonial political economy and the global economy’, paper to the ISA-
ABRI Joint International Meeting, (Rio de Janeiro, 2009, 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p381097_index.html). 
74 The withdrawal of external support is not straightforward for Africa either; see van de Walle, ‘The 
economic correlates of state failure’, 108-110. 
75 C. Bluth and O. Kassenov, ‘The “game” of security in Central Asia’, in Y. Kalyuzhnova and D. 
Lynch (eds), The Euro-Asian world. A period of transition, (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2000), 28-44. 
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The gains from these external guarantees of statehood have sometimes been direct 
and tangible, and sometimes not. Tangible and direct benefits to the regimes of the 
region include such things as the revenue that Kyrgyzstan has accrued through 
leasing the Manas air force base to the USA, a rental equal to seven to 10 per cent of 
Kyrgyz GDP (the rental also helped secure largesse from Moscow in early 2009, 
which was subsequently balanced by rent increase from the USA), or the increases 
in military and other aid that flowed to the region post-9/11 as the USA increased 
its presence in the region.76 Uzbekistan in particular has been very keen to play-off 
the USA and Russia. Security guarantees have meant that war has not had to make 
the state in Central Asia. Although it is difficult to measure Central Asian military 
spending on balance it seems to have been comparatively low for most of their 
independent history, rising slightly over the last few years because of the economic 
growth generated by Russia’s boom and by higher energy prices.77 In other words, 
there has not been a need to build up state capacity in the region to build up armies 
to deal with security threats; instead leaders have been left to use economic 
resources to support their regimes. This is despite the often-parlous state of 
relations within the regions over borders and cross-border trade, and water 
resources and their transit. These have not resulted in a build-up of military 
strength commensurate to deal with them in large part because such strength could 
not be used because of the reaction of Russia and China.  
 
More intangible benefits of the region’s security arrangements have been the 
protection of regimes from threats and hence deadened the development of conflict. 
The presence of Russian – and to a lesser extent other forces – in the region 
probably lessens the risk of internal conflict. Occasionally this reduction has been 
explicitly invoked. The Russian-Uzbek security treaty signed after the events in 
Andijan in 2005 provides for Russian intervention in Uzbekistan to suppress threats 
to the regime there. More generally, it is the case elsewhere in the world that coups 
are discouraged by the presence of foreign troops,78 or by implicit support of a 
major military power such as Russia, which is still in the region.79 Russia and the 
Shanghai Co-operation Organisation have also worked politically to stabilise the 
regimes of Central Asia.80  
                                                        
76 See the figures in S.W. Babus, ‘Democracy-building in Central Asia post-September 11’, in D.L. 
Burghart and T. Sabonis-Helf, In the tracks of Tamerlane. Central Asia’s path to the 21st century, 
(Washington, DC, National Defense University Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 
2004), 115-138. 
77 S. Perlo-Freeman and P. Stålenheim, ‘Military expenditure in the South Caucasus and Central Asia’, 
in A.J.K. Bailes, B. Hagelin, Z. Lachowski, S. Perlo-Freeman, P. Stålenheim and D. Trofimov, Armament 
and Disarmament in the Caucasus and Central Asia, (Stockholm, Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, 2003), 7-20. 
78 R.H.T. O'Kane, ‘A probabilistic approach to the causes of coups d’état’, British Journal of Political 
Science, 11 (1981), 287-308. 
79 Collier, Wars, guns, and votes, 86-87. 
80 T. Ambrosio, ‘Catching the “Shanghai Spirit”: How the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
promotes authoritarian norms in Central Asia’, Europe-Asia Studies 60 (2008), 1321-1344, and 
 
 
LIMERICK PAPERS IN POLITICS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
2010, No. 3 
26 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Prophecies of conflict in the post-Soviet space have so far not been fulfilled. The 
existence of weak states and weak (at best) democracies have not on their own been 
enough to tip the region, or parts of it, in to conflict, despite predictions that draw 
analogies between these phenomena and conflict in other parts of the globe. The 
post-Soviet cases show that something extra needs to be added to the mix to push 
weak states and weak democracies over the edge and in to conflict, and that some 
factors, such as the redistribution of economic resources when it is on the scale of 
post-Soviet redistribution, might help to avert conflict.  So far the post-Soviet cases 
have avoided the abyss and in large measure this is because they have held back on 
state building policies. These policies would have alienated parts of their 
populations, or divided elites and made them mobilise against one another, and 
potentially, as in models that see elites in weak democracies using nationalism to 
shore up their domestic position, turned post-Soviet states against each other.  
 
Is the substitution of regime for state building and the avoidance of conflict 
sustainable over time? The extent to which post-Soviet countries have been able to 
avoid harsh choices varies and so too will their ability to maintain this pattern of 
development and relative peace in the future. Some of the circumstances that may 
have helped them avoid conflict in the past are probably not going to be available to 
them in the future. The redistribution of property will be difficult to achieve again 
without violence, for example. Moreover, avoiding state building may be inherently 
unstable. The Russian and the Kyrgyz cases show the instability that can come with 
regimes dominating and supplanting state building. In Russia, the relationship 
between Yeltsin, regional and economic elites weakened economic reform efforts 
and were in part responsible for the 1998 economic crisis.81 In Kyrgyzstan the 
derailing of reform in the 1990s led to a huge build-up of foreign debt as the 
country traded on its reputation as the most progressive Central Asian state. This 
debt placed the economy and presidency of Akaev under great strain and was a 
contributory factor to the ‘Tulip revolution’ of 2005 that overthrew Akaev, and to 
the 2010 overthrow of Akaev’s successor, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, as he struggled to 
deal with the fallout of the international economic crisis in an already weak 
economy. Neither the 1998 crisis nor the ‘Tulip revolution’ and its aftermath have 
led to prolonged conflict. In Russia the 1998 economic crisis was followed by a fresh 
effort at regime building under Vladimir Putin that was supposed to create the 
                                                                                                                                                            
Authoritarian backlash. Russian resistance to democratization in the former Soviet Union, (Aldershot, 
Ashgate, 2008). 
81 N. Robinson, ‘The global economy, reform and crisis in Russia’, Review of International Political 
Economy, 6 (1999), 531-64. 
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basis for a renewed round of state building. This was to include the cleaning up of 
corruption, the reassertion of federal control over the regions, the subjugation of 
economic elites to political authorities, the generation of new forms of growth led 
by state agencies and development plans. In Kyrgyzstan Bakiyev managed to use 
electoral manipulation, threats and coercion to stabilise his regime for a time. His 
successors are leaning heavily on Russia to try to achieve the same ends, another 
sign that Russia has not acted in the same way as some other post-imperial powers.   
 
Both the Russian and Kyrgyz regimes (initially in the latter’s case) were fortunate 
that their crises occurred as international economic and political factors gave their 
economies a fillip so that crisis segued into economic growth and state building did 
not have to be pushed home aggressively.82 Once again then, regime building was 
more successful than state building, but whilst this remains the case across the post-
Soviet space the potential for crisis remains great.  Crisis, when it comes, might be 
of a regime (a succession crisis, for example)83, of the state (a fiscal crisis like that of 
1998, or like that of post-Akaev Kyrgyzstan), or some combination of both (like the 
‘Tulip revolution’). There is no necessary reason why crisis might not be solved, of 
course, or that fortuitous circumstance could intervene as it did for the Russians to 
save the day. But even saying that points, finally, to the very contingent and fragile 
nature of factors preventing a slide in to conflict in large parts of the post-Soviet 
space. In short, expectations of conflict within the former Soviet Union have been 
wrong so far but that is no reason to be confident that they will always be wrong. 
 
                                                        
82 On the Russian case see N. Robinson, ‘Russia: limiting the impact of crisis in a post-communist 
transitional economy’, in J. Robertson (ed.) Power and politics after financial crisis. Rethinking foreign 
opportunism in emerging markets,  (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 212-228. 
83 See Olcott, Central Asia’s second chance, 124-172, on the succession problems in Central Asia. 
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